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Abstract
Information intermediaries deliver information about a supplier’s product. They are paid
by those same suppliers they certify. This introduces con￿icts of interests as the interme-
diaries want to retain customers by delivering truthful information about suppliers, while
suppliers would want the intermediary to provide them with more customers than their qual-
ity would otherwise entitle them to.
The paper compares two options for information intermediaries: either propose a menu
of contracts to the suppliers so that they reveal their type, or ￿nd out by themselves the type
of the supplier. In the ￿rst case, a rent must be left to induce type revelation, in the other, the
intermediary must incur a cost to determine the type of the supplier. The paper shows that
competition leads to a more frequent use of direct revelation mechanisms at the expense of
independent research by the intermediary.
The paper contributes to the literature on certi￿cation intermediaries in two sided markets
by introducing a choice between relying on soft information or acquiring hard information
about the side of the market to be certi￿ed, and by studying the in￿uence of competition on
contract choices in such an extended setting.
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1Internet information intermediaries derive revenues from those same companies they are sup-
posed to advise their clients about. This introduces con￿icts of interest. This paper explores
the ef￿ciency of intermediation markets and examines the contractual arrangements governing
the use of listing and directory services, such as Google or Yahoo. Billboard and click-through
pricing are compared.1 Billboard pricing guarantees an audience for a given price. Click-through
is a pay-as-you-go scheme where advertisers pay only for the number of customers they actually
got. Those two types of contract lead to different motivations for the intermediary. The ￿rst
doesn’t encourage it to monitor the relationship customer-supplier, since its result is not under its
province anymore. The second gives more leeway to the intermediary and may force it to moni-
tor the messages sent from the supplier to the customer through the intermediary: as it imposes
no limits on how many customers a supplier may get, there is a risk that only the most prof-
itable messages are transmitted, instead of those that are of interest to the customer. Those two
dimensions (pro￿tability to the supplier vs. interest to the customer) are not always concomitant.
The paper models Internet intermediaries as advisers to customers. Intermediaries receive
queries for information about products or information. They answer those requests by providing
an assessment or a ranking of the alternative offerings. Customers expect to be given an objective
assessment of the adequateness between a supplier’s good and their needs. Intermediaries are
caught between repeat customers whom they want to retain, and suppliers who pay to get listed
among the options available to customers. Intermediaries provide a forum for suppliers to make
claims about their products. Those claims can be exaggerated, leading some customers to be
misled into buying the product.
A two-sided media market is modeled where media outlets offer informational content to
users and in turn sell their audience to the providers of that content. The intermediary contracts
with suppliers to provide customers with information about their product, and users then de-
cide, based on how objective the information was, whether to keep on using the intermediary’s
service. Competitors can divert an intermediary’s clientele by offering content providers more
advantageous contracting schemes. Since the intermediary’s service is to offer information about
a product, it loses customers if it cannot provide content.
This paper is concerned with the concentration of media markets, more particularly that of
search engines on the Internet. Search engines control the access to information about products
for many consumers and there is a natural tendency to monopolization of intermediation services.
Indeed, it is often better from the point of view of welfare that there be an unique intermediary
as this allows every member to bene￿t from maximum network effects ￿ the value of an inter-
mediary to its clients is in its pool of clients, and the larger that pool, the higher its value. The
usual criticism of monopoly for information intermediation is that it leads to the price exclusion
of too many players, so that a competitive setting can increase welfare by lowering prices for
2intermediation services.
This paper considers another advantage of a monopoly in information intermediation; an in-
termediary who knows that customers will not switch to another intermediary when their client
supplier doesn’t ￿t their need will not be tempted to lie to the customers and tell them their client
supplier is what they need. The usual criticism of that point of view is that with no threat from
competition, a monopoly may choose to favor the information suppliers that are ready to pay the
most to get their message across. This paper argues that having one dominant intermediary to
which all consumers go every time they need to search for a product doesn’t mean the market
is monopolistic as long as consumers are free to switch from one intermediary to the other and
there is free entry in intermediation markets. Imposing a monopoly may result in less objective
information being transmitted even though it may increases the ef￿ciency with which the inter-
mediary directs customers to suppliers. Trying to dismantle a dominant intermediary (such as
Google in the search engine market, for example) doesn’t help either.
The paper also shows how competition favors the use of billboard pricing contracts. More
ef￿cient, click-through based contracts that depend on the information the intermediaries obtain
on the potential audience for a product, are disadvantaged in competition. The best contracts are
those that lead to objective revelation of information about the supplier, but are not so ef￿cient
that they don’t leave enough customers for other intermediaries to serve. Click-through pricing,
which was made possible thanks to better monitoring of customers’ response to the information
provided by an information intermediary, is not favored by competition; using a less ef￿cient
system reduces competitive pressure and leads to higher pro￿ts for intermediaries.
The rest of the introduction brie￿y presents information intermediation services on the Inter-
net and paid-for placement systems for search engine rankings. It then goes on to a study of the
types of contracts that are signed between intermediaries and suppliers in paid-for listing markets.
A review of the literature is also provided. The nature of competition between intermediaries is
relegated to the introduction to the third part of this paper.
Overview of the industry Google, a search engine, AOL, both an Internet service provider
and a portal, Amazon, a book seller, mySimon, a comparison shopping service, FreeMarkets,
an e-marketplace and exchange, all are among the many listing and directories services, on-
line newspapers, newsletters and search engines that provide information to customers about
products. Information intermediaries select information, organize it and present it to customers.
By relying on such information intermediaries, the customer loses control over what he will be
exposed to. He draws in exchange on the intermediary’s vast repository of information, expertise
on the range of products it offers, and experience in matching the customer’s requirement to the
alternatives on the market. Henshaw (2001) report that 80% of Internet users employ search
3engines to locate information. Less than 20% view more than 2 pages of search results. This
shows either that search engines provide an excellent service, or that customers are very con￿dent
they rank search results in an appropriate way. Either way, intermediaries play a crucial role on
the Internet, and few suppliers can survive without them.
Most intermediaries rely in large part on fees paid by suppliers to get their product listed on
the intermediary’s website, mentioned in a newspaper, or favorably ranked in a search engine.
Baye and Morgan (2000) calculated that more than two-third of the top 300 newspapers in the
US market relied on advertising for more than half their revenues in 1997. This pattern is even
more pronounced on the Internet, where customers have become used to get content for free.
Intermediaries still claim that they are objective in their assessment of the suppliers and indeed
sponsorship does not necessarily equates to bribery: a clear separation between paid-for and
staff-provided content can be guaranteed in newspapers. No interest group will account for such a
signi￿cant share of the intermediary’s revenue that they can in￿uence its content. Customers have
access to a wide range of intermediaries, which ensures that an intermediary will be motivated
to maintain a reputation for objectivity. Finally, suppliers who are ready to pay to get advertised
presumably have something of value to offer to customers; an intermediary will act as a ￿lter for
information simply by making suppliers pay to broadcast.
Contracts in the Internet paid-for listing markets How do intermediaries manage their rela-
tionship with suppliers? Nadel (2000) shows how Internet intermediaries adopt different strate-
gies that provide for differing levels of objectivity in the advice provided to customers. Google
relies on an algorithm to rank search results, an algorithm that is based on objective measures
such as the popularity of a website. It derives pro￿ts from placing paid-for results on top of its
search results, in a separate box. CNET Networks on the other hand, displays only the prod-
ucts whose placement was paid for (http://shopper.cnet.com). The range of those strategies were
expanded thanks to the Internet; it became possible to monitor the response of customers to an-
nouncements about a product. This paper will contrast two systems. The ￿rst one will be called
billboard pricing (￿BB￿) and consists in announcing a price for placement on a website. A cer-
tain number of customers will be exposed to information about the product. The supplier buys a
certain number of impressions of the announcement. The second one will be called click-through
pricing (￿CT￿) and consists in announcing a price per customer directed to the supplier. There
is no guarantee on the number of customers who will be exposed to the message of the supplier.
Overall, three systems of CT pricing exist, from the supplier-oriented to the customer-oriented.
The ￿rst determines the order in which suppliers will be ranked based on their willingness to pay.
Bay9 (www.bay9.com), now Xuppa (www.xuppa.com) or Overture, which went public as Goto
(www.goto.com)areexamples. Thesecondisbasedonatwoorthree-tieredsystem: thecustomer
4can choose what type of results to use, as they are divided between general or sponsored results.
About (www.about.com) offers the customer the possibility to search into specialized categories
so as to eliminate eccentric results. Yahoo customers can choose results from Yahoo’s direc-
tory, in which suppliers must pay to be included (http://sponsoredsites.yahoo.com/terms.html),
or from a general search engine (Google until recently, and now a proprietary one). The third
determines the ranking based on the judgment of previous customers on the website. For exam-
ple, Google (http://adwords.google.com) determines the ranking of a supplier by using the rate
at which customers click-through in reaction to that supplier’s message . See also the appendix
A to Pereira (2002) for a good description of search engines pricing strategies, or Ellam (2003)
for a description of the Pay-Per-Click placement auctions of Overture and Google.
There are many ways to model the difference between the two types of placement systems.
This paper takes the following view: An intermediary who wants to provide objective advice has
two choices.
￿ It may contract on the number of customers the supplier may get. In that case, being
guaranteed a certain level of audience, the supplier will have no motivation to hide the true
quality of its product to the intermediary. This is the BB system, where the intermediary
commits to a certain number of impressions, and chooses how to ful￿ll its contract while
disappointing the least number of consumers possible.
￿ It may also decide to vary the number of customers the supplier will receive depending
on its type. In that case, the supplier will not reveal its type to the intermediary (or its
revelation will not be credible, as all will say they are of high quality). The intermediary
will therefore have to check by itself the quality of the product of the supplier, which
implies additional costs. This is the click-through contract, where an intermediary who
wantstoguaranteeacertainlevelofservicetothecustomersmustlimit, onewayoranother,
the ability of the supplier to make exaggerated claims.
The second system obviously seems to be preferable, but it also is more costly for the in-
termediary: it has to gather information on the product it intermediates and monitor the rela-
tionship. In a competitive context, though, intermediaries would presumably be led to choose
that system more often than if they were monopolies because it offers a higher level of service
to customers. This paper shows this is not the case: intermediaries compete not only vis-￿-vis
customers, but also for suppliers. Suppliers constitute the content offering of the intermediary.
The intermediaries must compete to attract suppliers who have to choose one channel to offer
their goods. Suppliers cannot offer their goods at all intermediaries at the same time, either be-
cause an intermediary must limit the number of suppliers it promotes, or because suppliers must
5sign exclusivity agreements with intermediaries, or ￿nally because there are high ￿xed costs to
establish a relationship with one intermediary.
An intermediary who checks the type of its supplier will be subject to more competitive
pressure than one who doesn’t: as it maximizes its return on each supplier by directing customers
to each supplier according to the type of the supplier, other intermediaries are left with less
customers to serve each period. They are therefore led to decrease the price they charge to
suppliers so as to encourage them to leave competing intermediaries and come advertise on their
site. This increased competition is shown to deter the use of a system of recommendation that
relies on knowing the type of the supplier.
The dynamics of the industry’s use of placement contracts This paper associates the use of
the BB and the CT system with the level of competition in the market and the ef￿ciency with
which ￿rms can ascertain the type of their suppliers and direct consumers accordingly. The paper
predicts that the use of CT pricing would be discouraged when competition becomes keener but
is encouraged as ￿rms better track the type of the suppliers they serve.
It is therefore interesting to see whether there is a trend toward the use of one or the other
system and whether that trend can be correlated both with the level of competition on the market
and with the cost of monitoring suppliers’ type. There are no global data available that deal
speci￿callywithtrendsinsearchengineplacementcontracts, butdatadealingwithglobalInternet
advertising markets are available and can be used as a proxy.
There are many variations on the CT pricing system but it is accounting for an increasing
proportion of Internet advertising. A recent article about on-line advertising, The Economist
(2003) claims that CT pricing accounts for about $2 billion in Internet ad revenues, or a quar-
ter of the total. Google and Overture are the main players in that kind of ‘search-related’ or
‘pay-for-performance￿ placement. The Interactive Advertising Bureau, an association for online,
interactive broadcasting, email, wireless and interactive television media companies, has been
releasing annual reports on the evolution of the Internet advertising industry since 1997. Those
show exponential growth of revenue from 1996 to 2000 (revenues doubled every year), followed
by a period of contraction in 2001 and 2002. Industry concentration did increase over the years,
especially with the shake-out in the ￿rst year of declining revenues, 2001. It is dif￿cult to infer
from those data whether the strength of competition did increase over the years, as the market
has always been very concentrated: the top 10 ad-selling companies account for more than 70%
of total revenues. On the one hand, it could be said that during the growth years there was room
for new entrants and competition was probably less ￿erce than during the last few years. But at
the same time, the shake-out in the industry in 2001, as well as the fact the industry became more
and more concentrated, could point to lower levels of competition as the industry consolidated
6and the companies that wanted to enter with aggressive tactics had to drop out.
(Graph 1 p. 7)
Figure 1: Internet advertising revenues and industry concentration
There is a trend toward more frequent use of performance-based pricing for placement at the
expense both of CPM (impression based) pricing and hybrid forms of pricing that combine the
two systems. Performance based pricing, which incluses cost per click, sale, lead or straight
revenue share (such as af￿liate marketing) is therefore on the rise.
(Graph 2 p. 8)
As argued above, it is dif￿cult to know if the level of competition increased or decreased
over the years However, as media-placement ￿rms grow bigger and more experienced and as
they establish long-term relationships with advertisers, they presumably become more ef￿cient
at using a performance based, CT system. The model allows to conclude from the apparent
stability in competitive pressure in the market that the rise in the use of CT pricing systems
comes from media-placement ￿rms gaining experience, mass and technological know-how to
deal with complex systems to sell placement on the Internet.
Literature This paper is related to the literature on two-sided markets and bias in advertising
(Gaudeul and Jullien 2004). There are four roles that are typically ascribed to intermediaries:
bringing together consumers and suppliers, setting the terms of the exchange, providing liquidity,
and guaranteeing the performance and quality of the trade. This paper is concerned with that
7Figure 2: Click-through vs. billboard pricing
last role: how an intermediary can improve the quality of the information transmitted about the
product of a supplier.
The literature can be divided depending on whether the intermediary has access to hard or
soft information about a supplier’s product. If the intermediary has access to hard information
about the supplier’s product, it can convey it credibly to customers. If the information is soft,
then customers can infer the type of the supplier from the choice they make among a menu of
incentive contracts offered by the intermediary. This paper accommodates those two possibilities
by assuming the intermediary can choose to transform soft information into hard information
at some cost (the cost to prove a claim). It proceeds to show that competition does not favor
independent inquiry by the intermediary.
The literature focuses on the monopoly case because there are economies of scale in certi-
￿cation markets, which makes of them natural monopolies. This paper shows that a dominant
intermediary had rather accommodate competitors than drive them out of the market as this al-
lows it to set higher prices for its service.
Previous literature has been concerned with the role of intermediaries as a tool to foster com-
petition between suppliers (Baye and Morgan 2000) or to spread information about products
(Kotowitz and Mathewson 1979). The main concern is whether a monopoly intermediary’s pric-
ing strategy will result in the exclusion of some elements of each side of the market, and thus
reduce information transmission. Baye and Morgan (2000) conclude that all consumers will par-
ticipate while some suppliers will be excluded, while Corbett and Karmakar (1999) conclude the
opposite will occur. That literature is an outgrowth of the literature on search, advertising and
price competition, and this paper abstracts from such concerns. Closer to this model is a paper by
8Bhargava and Feng (2002) studying the bias in the results provided by a search engine. Bhargava
and Feng (2002) consider the choice of a search engine whether to provide paid placement in its
result pages as a quality choice, by which consumers will judge its offering. There is a direct
disutility for consumers from having a portion of their search results in￿uenced by suppliers’
payment. The intermediary chooses its ‘quality’ by balancing the need to attract many customers
vs. the revenues generated from placement. However, their model doesn’t explain why con-
sumers should be concerned that some suppliers pay to have a high-ranking in search results.
The present model shows that this may in fact be a bad indicator of quality: you can perfectly
have all suppliers pay for listing, and the intermediary still giving out unbiased information about
them.
Another strand of literature that is closely related to this paper is that where the intermediary
is understood as a tool to balance the interests of both sides of the market. Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) analyze competitive strategies in that setting, but their paper is still concerned with pricing
and exclusion in homogeneous goods markets. Rochet and Tirole (2002) underline, like is done
in this paper, the ambiguous effect of competition on the pricing of intermediary’s services:
because prices for the service of an intermediary are reduced on both sides, it is not clear whether
competition favors the buyers’ or the sellers’ side. Their paper considers competition strategies
that are similar to those considered in this paper; intermediaries compete to attract suppliers, who
will determine the quality of their offering to consumers. The present paper is not concerned by
the price the intermediary will charge to each side of the market, it is concerned by the objectivity
of the information provided by the intermediary. Unlike other papers, competition is shown
to improve the quality of service provided by the intermediaries even though competition for
supplier-provided content deters them from using the more ef￿cient CT contract. Contrary to the
intuition, reducedrevenuesduetocompetitiondonotleadintermediariestoa‘racetothebottom’,
because deciding to cash in early leaves intermediaries even more exposed to competitors.
Other papers on the informational ef￿ciency of intermediation markets are well exposed in
Guerra (2001). That literature begins with Lizzeri (1999) and his paradoxical result that in-
formation intermediaries do not transmit information but only con￿scate the surplus from the
supplier-customer relationship. In that literature, Strausz (2003) is closely related to this paper
and provides motivation for this paper’s study of monopolistic but contestable intermediation
markets.
The paper is organized as follows: the strategy of a monopoly intermediary is studied, and the
propertiesofaBayesianNashequilibriumthatsustainstruthtelling(objectivity)onthepartofthe
intermediary are outlined. Competition is then introduced in the model. Its welfare consequences
are studied. The paper concludes with possible extensions.
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1.1 The model
Consider a market in which in each period t = 1;2;:::;1 a different monopolistic information
supplier enters with a good of quality qS in such a quantity as to be potentially able to serve the
wholeconsumermarket. Ineachperiodasuppliersisdrawnrandomlyfromamassofinformation
suppliers divided in two types denoted H and L. A supplier who was drawn once cannot be
drawn again and there is a constant renewal of the pool of suppliers. Suppliers of type H are
in proportion ￿: They derive net revenue rH from selling their good of quality qH: Suppliers of
type L are in proportion 1 ￿ ￿: They derive revenue rL from selling their good of quality qL:
A supplier can be listed only at one intermediary. They live only one period. Suppliers know
their own type. A supplier listed at intermediary i in period t receives qit customers and pays the
intermediary pit per customers. His pro￿t is therefore:
￿S = qit(rS ￿ pit) (1)
S = (H;L) (2)
A message (or a product) is composed of bits of information (or features). Each information
(or feature) comes on top of the other to progressively build a message (or product) that will
include all information (or features) that a consumer may require. Adding one information (or
feature) is costly, but gains consumers ￿ the information is more interesting or the product is
more sophisticated.
Assumption 1 Assume therefore that:
qL < qH (3)
rL > rH (4)
That assumption is not required for the conclusions of the model to hold, but it allows to
simplify the analysis. It is discussed at the end of the paper.
There is a mass 1 of customers with type qC drawn from an uniform distribution over [0;qH]
each period. A customer of type qC values a good of quality qS at v if qC < qS and v if qC >
qS:2 Customers know their own type but not the type of a supplier before consuming its good.
They learn it after consumption (experience goods). A customer who uses the service of the
intermediary i at time t is told the quality of the good is qit: Customers are in￿nitely lived. They
10all have the same reservation value R for the service of the intermediary. Customers cannot
communicate with each other. Their discount factor is ￿:






qCt ,! U[0;qH] (6)
with qCt the type of the customer at time t; qSt the type of the supplier at time t; and
pt(qit;qCt;ht) the probability the customer buys the product of the supplier at time t knowing
qit; its own type and ht = (qit;qCt;qSt)t=1;:::;t￿1:
There is one in￿nitely lived intermediary i that can be of two types, H or L: Type H discount
periods at rate ￿H and type L discount periods at rate ￿L; with ￿H > ￿L: Customers assign
probability " that the intermediary is of type L: Intermediary i does not know the type of its
client supplier S and doesn’t know the type of its customers. Each period, one supplier comes to
the intermediary, who offers customers at a price pit per customer. Suppliers choose to accept or
reject the offer, and the intermediary then chooses ait : whether to check the good of its supplier
of type S at cost c and then learn its type qS: It then directs qit of its customers to the supplier.
The mass of customers the intermediary receives each period is denoted mit and depends on the
strategy of the customers which will be exposed below.
The strategy of the intermediary consists in the choice of the triplet fpit;ait;qitgt=1;:::;1 over







ait = (check , not check) (8)
c(check) = c (9)
c(not check) = 0 (10)
How can an equilibrium be sustained where customers are never misled about the quality of
the product on the intermediary? For that to happen, customers must punish intermediaries who
misled them. Suppose customers adopts the following strategy: Stop using the intermediary’s
service if the supplier’s good is found to be of value v. That strategy is supported by the belief
the intermediary’s type is L whenever the supplier’s good is found to be of low value. It is a
rational belief which can be sustained in equilibrium under that strategy under some condition:
11Denote VH the expected value of the service provided by an intermediary of type H and VL the
expected value of the service provided by an intermediary of type L: The customers’ strategy
supports a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with objective placement if:
VH > R > VL (11)
and
(1 ￿ ")VH + "VL > R (12)
The ￿rst condition ensures that customers want to use the service of an intermediary if they
believe he is of type H but not if he is of type L, and the second ensures that in the absence of
information about the intermediary’s type, a customer will use its service.3
The intermediary’s contract choice will ￿rst be examined, and then the condition on ￿H;￿L
and R under which an objective placement Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game can be sus-
tained.
The contract choice by the intermediary will be studied only under the condition that pit <
rH; 8t: This eliminates the case where only one type of supplier can participate in the game.
1.2 The intermediary’s contract choice
Suppose the intermediary does not check the type of the supplier.
Claim 1 Intermediary i that doesn’t check the type of its information suppliers will offer an




: Else, he offers C = (p;q)
with p = rH and q = qH:
Proof. In appendix A
The intermediary will offer a unique contract because of assumption 1 which prohibits offer-
ing differentiated contracts. This means the only contract the intermediary can offer if it wants to
guarantee objective information revelation is one under which the supplier cannot claim having
a quality higher than that of a low type supplier. Indeed, allowing more would lead a supplier of
a low type to claim having higher quality than true.
Depending on its type (discount factor), the intermediary will choose either the objective
information revelation contract where suppliers cannot claim to have a high quality product, or
one which consists in allowing any supplier to claim he is of a high type. The more the quality
12difference the lower is
qL
qH and the more the intermediary is tempted to lie as the gain from lying
becomes greater. As the proportion ￿ of suppliers of high type increases the intermediary is
tempted to offer the C = (rH;qH) contract as there is lower probability it will lead to a bad
outcome for the customers.
Note that the difference in revenue rS that suppliers gain from customers visit doesn’t enter
into account as the intermediary must set its price at the lower of the two so as to allow participa-
tion by both types of intermediaries. The condition under which the intermediary indeed prefers
both suppliers to participate are not studied, as the case where one type of supplier is excluded is
trivial.
Notation 1 Denote C = (rH;q) with BBq.
Suppose now the intermediary checks the type of the supplier. There is no point checking it
if it doesn’t make qit depend on qS: This means the intermediary will offer no guarantee on qit
and the contract offering will be a price pit per customer directed.
Claim 2 Intermediary i that checks the type of its supplier will set p = rH and direct qit = qSt













] and c <
￿rH(qH￿qL)
￿qH+(1￿￿)qL.
Proof. In appendix B
Notation 2 Denote CT the strategy that consists in setting p = rH and directing qit = qSt
customers each period.
The possibility to use a CT contract improves the range of ￿ for which the intermediary is able
to sustain objective information revelation because unlike the objective BB contract, it doesn’t
limit it to directing only qL customers each period irrespective of their type. For ￿ high, an
intermediary using the BB system would have to limit himself to directing qL customers each
period so as to be certain to offer perfect service and not lose any customer.
The CT pricing system frees the intermediary to direct qH customers to a supplier of type H.
If the probability that such a supplier comes asking for service at the intermediary is high, or if
qH is very much higher than qL; then the range of c for which the intermediary wants to use the
CT pricing system widens. The click-through based system may be preferred to the placement
system because it gives wider latitude to the intermediary to report truthfully to the consumer the
information he has about the supplier.
13Choosing the CT system has a cost since the intermediary cannot get suppliers to reveal their
type as it doesn’t guarantee them a given number of customers. That cost limits the range of c for
which the CT contract is used. The CT pricing system is preferred for c relatively low. Indeed,
the cost of gathering information about the supplier and the customers is then low enough, so
that the gain in effectiveness from switching to the CT pricing system is high enough for the
intermediary to prefer it to a BB pricing system.
TheavailabilityoftheCTpricingsystemthusbroadenstherange(￿;c)whereobjectiveplace-
ment can be implemented. Since on the Internet the cost c of checking the quality of information
and processing the information on each customers’ click-through is presumably low, it is possi-
ble that the CT pricing system does indeed allow to sustain objective placement in case where it
could not have been sustained under traditional BB pricing system. It thus can increase welfare
in practice.
The equilibrium choice of contracts can be represented in the (￿;c) plane:
(Graph 3 p. 14)
(Numerical example with rH = 1; rL = 2; qH = 3; qL = 1; ￿ = 0:4)
Figure 3: The monopoly’s contract choices.
The intermediary’s pro￿t function can be represented for a moderate level of c where the CT
contract will be preferred to the BBqL contract for ￿ high
14Figure 4: The monopoly’s pro￿t function for moderate levels of c (c = 0:3).
(Graph 4 p. 15)
This graph shows that the CT system allows the intermediary to increase pro￿t compared to
the CPM system and also increases the range of ￿ where a contract sustaining truthful information
is chosen.
The condition for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with objective placement to exist can now be
laid down:












] An objective placement Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium exists for
￿L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿H (13)
and
Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v
qH
￿ R ￿
(1 ￿ ")qLv + "(Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v)
qH
(14)
Proof. From claim 2 and the conditions laid down in the exposition of this model for a BNE
equilibrium with truthful information revelation on the part of the intermediary to be sustained.
The ￿rst condition guarantees that an intermediary of a low type will use the BBqH contract,
which consists in directing all customers to any supplier at hand, while an intermediary of a
high type will use either a CT or a BBqL contract. The second condition ensures customers,
when having found out an intermediary is of a low type, will not want to use its service anymore
15because the expected value of that service is less than the reservation value (left side of the
equation), while they are ready to use the service of an intermediary when they do not know its
type (right side of the equation). Note that since the value of the service of an intermediary that
uses the BBqL system is lower than that of one who uses the CT system, it is the value of the ￿rst
one which is relevant to ensure the consumers use the service of the intermediaries irrespective
of c:
Under those conditions, the system of belief of the customers is validated by the equilibrium
behavior of intermediaries. Only low type intermediaries lie to the customer, while high type
intermediaries guarantee perfect service. It is rational not to use the service of low type inter-
mediaries because the expected value of their service is lower than the customer’s reservation
value.
Remark 1 If ￿H < ￿ or ￿L > ￿; then there exists an equilibrium with misleading placement
where either no customers use the service of the intermediary ( R > Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v) or all
do (R < Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v):
The conditions under which one or the other pricing system will be preferred can be casually
observed outside of the Internet setting. A retailer who buys a stylist’s stock and then sells it
himself, is an example of an intermediary that uses the BB contract, ensuring to the stylist a
revenue and gaining the right to direct access to the goods. Presumably, the BB contract is used
there because it would be very expensive to use the alternative CT system, where the goods would
have to be shipped on demand after having determined the type of each incoming customers.
A fashion magazine, giving tips to consumers, and information about new trends, is a good
example of an intermediary who prefers not taking the risk of buying the stocks of the supplier.
It relies instead on a CT contract, based on the effective sales made by the supplier through
its recommendations. Some paper magazines indeed offer coupon to their readers, allowing it to
monitorhowmanycustomerswentthroughwithitsadvice. On-lineintermediariescanmonitorin
real time the effect of their recommendations to customers, as they click through to the suppliers
they reference under the form of links. In that case, the intermediary does not have to stock the
supplier’s good, the advising and selling are separate activities, so that the cost of advising the
client does not include the product shipping and stocking costs. The CT system then makes sense
because c is low. It would be worth gathering statistics to prove that intermediaries who use
sophisticated technologies to determine the type of their advertisers or who operate in a domain
where such information is easy to obtain, will tend to use the CT contract.
162 Competing intermediaries
Information markets are very concentrated, and intermediaries compete based on content. A
model of competition must take those two factors into account. Customers will therefore be
assumed to all go to the same intermediary in the ￿rst period, and then cascade to the next ones
ranked by order of importance. Additionally, intermediaries will be assumed to compete on
content alone, i.e. they are not able to directly divert customers from competing intermediaries.
However, they will be assumed to have access to competing intermediaries’ content suppliers,
and to be able to make them offers so that they switch to their own service.
Those assumptions are justi￿ed below, after which an outline of the main results is provided.
The intermediation market is modeled after the organization of the Internet intermediation
markets, where there is both a dominant intermediary and easy switching from one intermediary
to the other. On Internet information markets, there is one dominant intermediary, and then a
multitude of lesser intermediaries that are ranked by order of importance. The dominant, number
one choice intermediary can be pictured as Yahoo, which reached 51 percent of the worldwide
Internet population and consistently is a leading web destination (Nielsen/Netrating 2001 for
SearchEngineWatch.com) It can also be pictured as AOL, which is the dominant ISP in the US
(26% of Internet subscribers in the US, with MSN a distant second with 9%) and is very success-
ful at retaining its customers into its private portal offering; most AOL users never go far beyond
what AOL-sanctioned suppliers offer them. Finally, Google can also be pictured as the refer-
ence intermediary. Indeed, in January 2004 and according to a Nielsen/Netrating survey Google
ranked as the top Internet search destination before Yahoo, MSN and AOL. There are different
types of intermediaries, ￿general interest￿ like those evoked here, and those that are specialized
in a category, like CNET for technology products. Each category has its own dominant inter-
mediary. Smith and Brynjolffson (2001) and Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, and Lohse (2001)
mention various statistics that show how consumers are indeed very loyal to the dominant inter-
mediary in a category of product. Amazon customers, for example, pay their service an average
of 5% more than services of less well known intermediaries. The large majority of customers
remain loyal to one intermediary for all their searches in one product category.
There are few observations on the patterns and nature of competition between listing services
trying to obtain sponsored search revenues. It will therefore have to be modeled after similar
industries. Competition between intermediaries will be modeled after observations of the way
competition in the publishing industry works and also from seeing how Internet media suppliers
try to acquire content through aggressive deals and acquisition of content producers. Competition
17forcontentisafeatureofthepublishingindustry. Intermediariesmustleaveenoughpro￿ttothose
who provide content (news, entertainment, etc) so that they don’t move, they and their audience,
to competing intermediaries.
Most journals, when they agree to publish a work, want what is called ‘￿rst publication
rights’, that is, they want the exclusive rights to publish this work before any other journal. This
is a way to protect themselves against opportunistic switching of authors to competitors, which
would leave them with no content to publish.
Publishing houses compete by trying to hire the better or most promising author at another
publisher. A constant in media markets is that people who produce successful programs, write
good articles, or more generally are the main attractor of audience to a channel tend to get en-
ticed away from their ￿rst employer once they have attracted the attention from other, bigger
intermediaries. Some TV and radios specialize in breeding such new talents, which are then
sold to bigger, more powerful media outlets. This shows the importance of content providers to
intermediaries, and their possible diversion from their initial employer.
On the Internet, AOL and Time Warner merged just so as to create synergies that the ex-
clusive right by AOL to distribute Time Warner’s content over the Internet would create. For
example, AOL is the only one to offer ‘Harry Potter’ paraphernalia on its site and this enhances
its appeal to customers. This was a way for AOL to ensure it wouldn’t have to compete with
other intermediaries for Time Warner content. Another example illustrating the threat of vertical
foreclosure by dominant intermediaries on the Internet was pointed out by the European commis-
sion when examining the AOL/Time Warner vertical merger. The merged entity had preferred
access to Bertelsmann’s content, and in particular its music library. This gave it the possibility
to foreclose downstream competitors. In the Vivendi/Seagram/Canal + merger, the pooling of
Seagram’s Universal Music arm and Vivendi’s Internet portal Vizzavi rose similar concerns. Fi-
nally, when Google bought Pyra, a blog hoster,4 there were widely shared concerns that other
search engines would see their access to Pyra’s administered blogs limited. There is therefore
clearly the possibility for intermediaries to monopolize the content offered by their suppliers, as
illustrated by those mergers involving intermediaries and content suppliers, and there is therefore
an incentive for competing intermediaries to break up that monopoly. In those examples like in
others, contracts based on performance (the number of viewers attracted) coexist with ￿xed term
contracts that guarantee a certain level of revenue for the content provider. The media outlet may
have exclusivity provisions written into their agreement to launch the career of those information
providers, entertainers or journalists, but those are generally limited in time. Another way to
avoid problems is also the strategy by some journals, such as The Economist, to not credit their
articles to individual journalists. Outsiders are then less able to spot talents. The essential feature
of competition in this model is that information suppliers ￿ music groups, think tanks, individ-
18ual reporters, etc. ￿ are ￿rst hired by information intermediaries ￿ majors, newspapers, radios,
televisions... ￿ and then receive competitive offers that are aimed not so much at enlarging the
product offering of the competing intermediaries than at weakening the product offering of their
closest competitor. Indeed, in the present model, an intermediary does not gain anything directly
from diverting a supplier from a competitor, he only gains the customers of that competitor.
The literature on competition in information markets frequently is concerned by potential
degradation in overall service in the market (Santos and Scheinkman (2001) in ￿nancial markets,
Anderson and Coate (2000) in the case of radio and television advertising for example). In the
present model, competition gives more freedom of choice to the customers so that not serving
them today may lead them to go to another intermediary. The intermediary is then tempted to
exploit them now by pretending to have a valuable service to offer even if that is not the case.
He knows that if he doesn’t, the customer will possibly be lost to another intermediary. This is
what is called the ‘race to the bottom’. However, since even bad intermediaries may sometime
direct customers correctly, while good intermediaries are the only ones to sometime not direct
customers, the customer has a better a-posteriori on an intermediary who did not direct him
in a previous period than on one who directed him, and will therefore want to use its service
again. This will be shown to limit the opportunistic exploitation of customers, and to maintain
the possibility of a well functioning intermediation system; there is no complete unraveling of
the quality of service.
Competition will be shown to lead to a possible decrease in the ef￿ciency of an individual in-
termediary, who will exercise less editorial control over its paid-for content. Indeed, competition
will favor the use of rigid BB contracts at the expense of the use of CT contracts; the range of
values for ￿ and c such that the BB system is used will be widened compared to the monopoly
setting. Competition will however increase overall welfare, because clients now have the oppor-
tunity to switch information provider if they are not satis￿ed with their present one. As customers
are now more mobile, the intermediary would be tempted to exploit them and send them to any
announcer at hand, instead of attempting to retain them. Indeed, any customer who is rightly told
the supplier’s good is not valuable will go to another intermediary who may have a good that
is to the customer’s taste. Therefore, it would seem to not be very worth-wile trying to advise
customers truthfully. However, an intermediary who chooses to lie to customers will be subject
to even more competitive pressure from other intermediaries than if he provided the customers
with an objective service. Indeed, if an intermediaries tries to monopolize its audience, the other
intermediaries will be more motivated to divert suppliers from that intermediary in order to break
its monopoly. The price that can be charged to the supplier will have to be set low enough so as
to provide the supplier with enough pro￿t for that supplier not to be tempted to sell exclusivity
19to another intermediary. The pro￿t that is left to the supplier will be proportionally higher when
the incentives of the competing intermediary to get the clients of the other intermediary rise, and
that incentive rises in proportion with the number of customers the other intermediary keeps for
himself in each period. The objectivity of an intermediary will therefore become greater due to
competition.
Competition thus increases welfare most of the time, both because customers have access to
more products each period ￿ if an intermediary doesn’t have the product he wants, he can go to
another intermediary who may have his desired product ￿ but also because it puts pressure on the
intermediaries to behave well. Competition therefore brings about an improvement in ef￿ciency,
quite apart from the fact the customers have access to more options each period ￿ they can get
advice from many intermediaries.5
2.1 The model
Thereisanin￿nityofintermediariesthatarerankedfrom1toin￿nitybyconsumers. Thisranking
determines in which order they will get visited by consumers. All customers go to the ￿rst
intermediary in the ￿rst period. They then go on to the next-ranked intermediary if the product
offered by the ￿rst intermediary does not correspond to their taste. Intermediaries and customers
are in￿nitely lived, while suppliers are active only one period. One supplier can contract with
only one intermediary each period6, but he can receive many offers prior to settling with one
intermediary. Those offers can be conditioned on the contracts offered by other intermediaries.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1) One supplier comes to each intermediary. The intermediary announces pit and/or qit: The
supplier accepts the intermediary’s contract or not. If they accept, the intermediary chooses ait:
2) Intermediaries offer payments to suppliers at other intermediaries. Suppliers decide to
accept or not. A supplier who accepts leaves the intermediary it contracted with in ￿rst stage. It
can accept only one offer by one intermediary.
3) Intermediaries who have a supplier direct qit consumers to the supplier.
5) Consumers buy the product of the supplier, and learn qSt:
6) Consumers choose which intermediary’s service to use next period.








qCt ,! U[0;qH] (16)
20with qCt the type of the customer at time t; qSt the type of the supplier at time t; and
pit(qit;qCt;ht) the probability the customer buys the product of the intermediary i0s supplier
at time t knowing qit; its own type and ht = (qit;qCt;qSt)t=1;:::;t￿1;i=1;:::;t￿1: pit is de￿ned in a
unique way by the strategy of the consumer.
Suppose consumers adopt the following strategy: Go to intermediary 1 in the ￿rst period. Buy
a supplier’s good if qit ￿ qCt: Go to intermediary i in period t+1 if qCt ￿ qSit: Go to intermediary
i+1 in period t+1 if qi(t+1) < qC(t+1); or qCt > qSit: qCt is the type of the consumer in period t;
qSit is the type of intermediary i ’s supplier in period t; and qit is intermediary i0s announcement
about the type of its supplier in period t (it translates in this system in the number of consumers
who buy the supplier’s product).
In the same way and using the same exposition as in the part 2; there is a Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium of this game with objective placement if there is separation of type of the intermediaries,
i.e.
VH > R > VL (17)
and
(1 ￿ ")VH + "VL > R (18)
The ￿rst condition ensures that customers want to use the service of an intermediary if they
believe he is of type H but not if he is of type L, and the second ensures that in the absence of in-
formation about the intermediary’s type, a customer will use its service. Under those conditions,
beliefs and strategies of customers are rational.
The following graph shows how customers cascade from one intermediary to the next: A
customer goes to intermediary 1 in the ￿rst period. If directed to a supplier, he consumes its
product. If that one is inadequate, he goes to intermediary 2 next period. If he is not directed to a
supplier, he goes to intermediary 2 in the same ￿rst period. He keeps on going from intermediary
to intermediary until he is directed, but whatever happens, he will go back to intermediary 1 in
period 2 because his a-priori on intermediary 1 can only have improved when that one didn’t
direct him in period 1.
(Graph 5 p. 22)
The intermediary’s contract choice will ￿rst be examined, and then the condition on ￿H;￿L
and R under which a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game can be sustained.
Before doing so, let’s make an assumption on the parameters of the model:











This assumption is not necessary but simpli￿es the analysis.
2.2 Analysis of the model
This model makes the study of competition rather simple: all intermediaries are in the same
position vis-￿-vis the next intermediary than the previous intermediary is vis-￿-vis themselves.
Therefore, in equilibrium, they all follow the same strategy since they all are bound by the same
constraints.
If a supplier that got into a contractual relationship with an intermediary in stage 1 agrees not
to be listed at that intermediary anymore, then that intermediary will be left with nobody to direct
his customers to, and customers will have to go to the next intermediary.
The strategy followed by one intermediary must therefore take into account the possibility
that the next intermediary offers payments that would make one or both types of supplier break
their contract.
This puts a bound on the pro￿t per-customer that the intermediary can make, if he is to deter
the next intermediary from breaking its contract with its suppliers. This bound is the ratio of the
cost of breaking a contract to the number of customers gained by breaking a contract. The cost
of buying out a supplier is the payment to compensate him for his lost pro￿ts, i.e. what he would
make had he stayed at the competing intermediary.
22Pro￿t per customer of the intermediary <
Pro￿t of the supplier
Number of customers gained by asking for exclusivity
The (n + 1)th intermediary is ready to pay a supplier an amount which is equivalent to the
bene￿t it gets from that nth intermediary not being able to directs its customers, and this is equal
to the additional number of customers intermediary n + 1 gains by hiring away the competitor’s
supplier, times the pro￿t it makes with those additional customers. Other intermediaries farther
away in the ranking of intermediaries have less incentive to buy exclusivity from the suppliers
of that intermediary. An intermediary is motivated to pay suppliers not to go to intermediaries
that are far removed from them in the ‘line of succession’ so as to accelerate the rate at which
customers ￿nally come to them. but that incentive is always lower than the incentive for the next-
in-line intermediary, so that only those must be taken into account. For example, the (n + 2)th
intermediary is ready to pay n 0s supplier not to accept customers from the nth intermediary, but
less so than the (n + 1)th intermediary would be ready to do: the number of customers gained is
less and farther away in time, so that it is the constraint vis-￿-vis the (n + 1)th intermediary that
bounds pro￿ts.
It is not possible, when attempting to break a supplier-intermediary contracts, to know the
type of the supplier at the intermediary. A payment that would motivate suppliers of type L to
break its contract will also lead suppliers of type H to do so: Suppliers of type L make higher
pro￿ts than suppliers of type H for any choice of contracts by the intermediary, so that buying
exclusivity from suppliers of type L will also encourage suppliers of type H to deviate.
It is therefore more ef￿cient to make suppliers of type H only deviate instead of both types:
they are less expensive to distract from a competing intermediary ￿ their pro￿t per customer is
lower ￿ and the intermediary gets a higher return (number of customers) from them. Even though
the probability that a given supplier accepts is lowered ￿ there is only probability ￿ that he is of
type H ￿ , suppliers of type H are those that can serve a higher number of customers and this
gives their deviation more impact than the deviation of suppliers of type L.
The intermediaries will choose the strategy that forces the next intermediary to pay the high-
est possible price per additional customer gained, while minimizing that number of customers
that can be gained. This is indeed the strategy that allows it to make the highest pro￿ts. All
intermediaries will follow that strategy; they will not want to adopt another strategy that would
make it more ef￿cient for their direct competitor (the next intermediary) to buy exclusivity.
As mentioned above, the intermediaries will choose the type of contract which gives the
highest pro￿t given the contract choice of the previous intermediary. Each intermediary will
choose the same type of contract, since they are all in the same position vis-a-vis the previous
intermediary, and therefore, their optimal contract is the same.
From the monopoly case, the contracts of interest are the CT contract where e qit = qSit; 8t,
23and the two BB contracts, BBqL and BBqH:
The intermediaries’ pro￿t functions are calculated in the proof of the next proposition. The
only change from the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 is that a no-deviation constraint must be
added, whereby no intermediary is willing to pay a supplier to break his contract with an inter-
mediary. This holds if a supplier makes more pro￿t by staying put at a ￿rst intermediary than
what a second intermediary would gain by getting that supplier not to accept any customer from
that ￿rst intermediary.






Proof. In appendix C
The intermediaries make a lower pro￿t per customer than in the monopoly case because the
contracts must be robust to deviation by suppliers. That lowering is more pronounced for con-
tracts that result in lying to customers than for those that result in objective, truthful placement.









when there was a monopoly.
The intermediary should have been more willing to exploit all its customers in each periods,
since the per customer revenue is lower due to competitive pressure. However, that pressure
on prices applies on all choices of a pricing system. This is why there are less intermediaries
choosing to lie to customers than in the monopoly case. The range for which the BBqL system
is used is increased versus the monopoly case, because the lower is the number of customers
promised to the supplier, the lower will be the incentive to buy exclusivity from suppliers. Indeed,
when the BBqL system is used, a competing intermediary will gain only ￿qL clients by buying
exclusivity from type H suppliers, while it would gain ￿qH clients if the BBqH system was used.
Therefore, the intermediary using the BBqH system will have to lower prices by a greater amount
relative to the monopoly case than is required when using the BBqL system.
As in the monopoly case, the CT system is used only when it results in objective placement,
and must be compared ￿rst to the BBqL system when ￿ is high and then to the BBqH system,
which is the second best. The following proposition shows in what domain the objective place-
ment systems will be used:
Claim 4 Intermediary i will do objective placement in competition if
￿i ￿ min[












24In that ￿ range, the CT contract will be chosen for any c ￿ rH(1 ￿
qL(2qH)
Eq(qH+qL)) while the BBqL
contract will be chosen for c ￿ rH(1 ￿
qL(2qH)
Eq(qH+qL)):
Proof. In appendix D
The following graph shows the pro￿t per customer of the intermediaries as ￿ increases. Com-
paring this with the monopoly case, pro￿ts are lower, but the lowering is more pronounced for ￿
low than for ￿ high, which explains why objective placement is more frequent. However, while
in the monopoly case the CT pricing system was used for ￿ high, here, it is more ef￿cient to use
the BBqL system.
(Graph 6 p. 25)
Figure 6: The pro￿ts per customer when there is competition.
Thisgraph, whichsuperposesthetwographsrepresentingpro￿tspercustomersinthemonopoly
and in the competitive case, shows how the range where objective placement is used is broad-
ened (arrows), but while CT was used by a monopoly for ￿ high, it is BBqL which is used by an
intermediary in a competitive setting:
(Graph 7 p. 26)
Comparing the pro￿t obtained under the different pricing systems, the objective placement
systems are used more often than in the monopoly case, but the most ef￿cient objective placement
system, CT is used less often.
25Figure 7: The pro￿ts per customer when there is competition compared with a monopoly setting.
The CT pricing system is used less often than in the monopoly case, because the BBqL pricing
system is more robust to suppliers’ deviation. When the CT pricing system is used and leads to
objective revelation of the type of the supplier to the customers, a deviation by suppliers of
type H leads the intermediary to lose qH customers with probability 1 ￿ ￿, while it loses only
qL customers when BBqL; the similar truthful revelation system under the BB pricing system,
is used. This means the BB pricing system is less sensitive to the bribing strategies of other
intermediaries. The intermediary therefore doesn’t need to leave so much pro￿t to the supplier to
avoid him deviating. The BB pricing system will therefore be used for a wider range of c:
The following graph shows how competition favors the use of the BBqL contract. Compe-
tition extends the domain in which objective placement contracts will be used compared to the
monopoly setting.
(Graph 8 p. 27)
Numerical example with rH = 1; rL = 2; qH = 3; qL = 1; ￿ = 0:4;
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26Figure 8: The intermediaries’s contract choices in competition, compared with the monopoly
setting.
Proof. In appendix E
The existence conditions are generally less strict than in the monopoly case, in the sense that
￿H doesn’t need to be as high as before for objective placement to occur; and the acceptable range
for R is wider.
Now, it is quite obvious that consumer welfare is always enhanced by competition, because
the range (￿;c;R) where objective placement occurs is widened, and consumers now have more
choice. It is of no importance that there is less use of the CT pricing system: Even though
an individual intermediary may use a less ef￿cient, but objective, placement system, that loss of
ef￿ciency doesn’t matter for the consumer who can go to other intermediaries if he is not directed
at one stage of a period.
3 A simple extension
Itisnotrealisticthatonetypeofsupplier, typeH;couldsatisfytheneedofallcustomers, although
this made for clarity of exposition. Let us therefore look at a more plausible case where qC ,!
U[0;Q] with Q > qH: How is this going to change the results? In the monopoly case, the value
of retaining a customer is lowered, so that the (￿;c;R) range where a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
(￿BNE￿) with objective placement exists is restricted.
The proposition for the monopoly case is modi￿ed as follows:










] An objective place-
ment Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists for
￿L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿H (23)
and
Eqv + (Q ￿ Eq)v
Q
￿ R ￿
(1 ￿ ")qLv + "(Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v)
Q
(24)
Proof. This is a simple modi￿cation of the proof in the case where Q = qH:
The higher is Q; the lower is the average expected value of retaining a customer since the
probability he will be interested by the product offered is lowered. The effect that is widely
discussed in the literature, i.e. the unraveling of the service offered by intermediaries and the
race to the bottom ￿nally emerges in the setting of this model. Therefore, there will be some
cases where a BNE with objective listing existed in the monopoly case, and is not anymore
sustained in competition.















placement Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists for
￿L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿H (25)
and
Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v
Q
￿ R ￿
(1 ￿ ")qLv + "(Eqv + (Q ￿ Eq)v)
"Q + (1 ￿ ")qL
(26)
Proof. This is a simple extension of the proofs made when Q = qH in the preceding part.
The effect of setting Q > qH can be seen in the graph below to reduce the (￿;c) domain
where an objective placement BNE exists. The range of R where this BNE exists is also reduced.
That effect means that competition can sometime result in a reduction in welfare.
(Graph 9 p. 29)
Numerical example with rH = 1; rL = 2; qH = 3; qL = 1; ￿ = 0:4; Q = 4
4 The effect of competition on welfare
It is important to understand the effect of introducing competition in information intermediation
markets. From a public policy point of view, regulators could become concerned about, for ex-
ample, Google’s dominance as a search engine. They may want to impose some regulation in
28Figure 9: The effect of increasing Q
that market, thus sanctioning but also con￿rming its monopoly. Or they may encourage entry of
competitors. In the context of the present model, competitive pressure on a dominant intermedi-
ary is as great as on other intermediaries (they all offer the same contracts). The discussion at the
end of the paper indicates that breaking up the market would not improve the situation either.
The following proposition shows how competition in￿uences welfare:
Proposition 5 Competitionalmostalwaysimprovestheoverallqualityofserviceinthemarketas
the range of ￿ for which intermediaries choose to truthfully reveal information is broadened, and
the presence of more intermediaries increases the probability with which a customer is directed in
one period. Competition may lower the probability with which an individual intermediary directs
a customer as the CT pricing system may be replaced by the BBqL system which is more robust
to competition but less ef￿cient. There are cases where competition will result in the breakdown
of a BNE with objective placement when going from a monopoly to a competitive setting.
Proof. In appendix F
The following graph illustrates the domains where welfare is increased, and the domain where
it is lowered. There is a range for ￿H moderate and c low, where the system of belief of the
customers becomes unsustainable. The range of c where the CT system is used is lowered and
the range of ￿ where it is used is not broadened enough to eliminate those instances where the
BBqH system replaces the CT system.
The intuition is that there are two effects at work that affect the range where an objective
placement BNE exists in competition. The ￿rst one has already been studied in the literature:
with competition, intermediaries cannot charge suppliers as much per customer directed, so that
29the value of a customer is lowered and therefore, intermediaries are more willing to sell their
audience now instead of later. This works to diminish the range (￿;c;R) where an objective
placement BNE exists. But there is also another effect at work to expand the range: letting
customers trickle down to other intermediaries means those intermediaries put less pressure on
the price per customer the intermediary can charge a supplier. This is because the incentive to
buy-out an intermediary’s information content suppliers so as to get its customers is lowered:
why pay to get customers you will get anyway? Overall, the effect of competition on whether an
objective placement BNE exists is ambiguous: if c; the cost to check the type of a supplier and
administer a CT pricing system, is high, then competition potentially increases welfare. If c is
low, then competition may decrease welfare.
(Graph 10 p. 30)
Numerical example with rH = 1; rL = 2; qH = 3; qL = 1; ￿ = 0:4; Q = 4
Figure 10: A comparison of welfare in competition and in a monopoly setting.
5 Conclusion
The paper shows how competition affects the contract offering of information intermediaries (and
thus the probability with which they deliver good service). An intermediary will not want to use a
contractthatistooef￿cient, becausedoingsowouldpreventthetricklingdownofcustomersfrom
the dominant intermediary to the alternative ones. In an objective placement BNE, all customers
30go to the dominant intermediary in each period, and in each period, some of those customers
visit alternative intermediaries if the dominant intermediary did not offer the good they need.
However, they will come back next period to the dominant intermediary.
Those results settle some controversy over which pricing system will be used in competition,
and whether competition improves the quality of service in the market. There is a domino effect
that leads to a degradation of service quality as customers become less valuable and interme-
diaries want to exploit customers now instead of trying to retain them. This domino effect is
countered by another effect as lowering quality simply results in a more than proportional reduc-
tion in the price that can be charged to suppliers. Indeed, an intermediary who reduces quality
and directs more customers gives other intermediaries more incentive to distract customers from
it. Competition thus generally encourages honesty in placement, but it also discourages the inter-
mediary from making their own research on the suppliers (use of the CT system), and leads them
to increasingly rely instead on an in￿exible system that doesn’t take into account information
about the supplier’s type.
6 Discussion
6.1 Suppliers’ incentives
Suppliers were assumed to belong to two types, ￿spammers￿, who have a message of low interest
to most consumers but may derive high bene￿ts from transmitting it, and others, who incurred
high costs to express a message that is useful to most consumers. In that view, a message (or a
product) is composed of bits of information (or features). Each information (or feature) comes on
top of the other to progressively build a message (or product) that will include all information (or
features) that a consumer may require. Adding one information (or feature) is costly, but gains
consumers. In the model, though, those suppliers who have the most attractive information make
less pro￿t than those who did less effort; the intermediary extracts most of their surplus. There
is therefore little incentive to produce high quality information in this partial model. It could be
extended to take into account information suppliers’ incentives to produce.
However, the assumption that high quality information producers made lower pro￿ts than
low quality ones was made mainly for ease of analysis; it led to an unique BB contract being
proposed. The revenues that an information supplier may get from a visit by a consumer were
implicitly de￿ned from the production cost perspective. The possibility that a consumer may be
ready to pay more for an information of higher quality was not considered: this is because it is
very dif￿cult for a short-lived information supplier to convey the value of its information before
selling it. Moreover, the intermediary’s message is restricted to saying whether the supplier’s
31product is good or isn’t. Suppliers cannot differentiate based on the intermediary’s message and
their product is therefore sold at the same price irrespective of their type.
Changing the assumption on costs would potentially lead to the intermediary proposing a
menu of BB contracts instead of only one, and this will improve the ef￿ciency of BB based
contracts. However, the CT-based contract always will be more ef￿cient, so that the analysis of
the basic trade-off outlined in this model remains valid.
6.2 Communication between customers
Customers could observe the accounts by previous customers about one intermediary’s quality of
service, as customers can choose to warn others about the quality of the service they experienced.
Indeed, it is often said in the marketing literature that one happy customer will seldom tell others
about it, while one unhappy one will be very vocal. Customers also frequently organize them-
selves in groups to defend their rights as consumers and propagate information about the quality
of service they were provided. Information intermediary’s website are frequently built so as to
allow customers to give feedback and communicate with others. This is a way for the intermedi-
ary to put some limits to its own opportunistic behavior. The problem is that it is dif￿cult to trust
the intermediary to not erase bad feedback about its service, so that there must be a modicum of
independent control on the monitoring system.
In the extreme, information intermediaries such as Slashdot (http://slashdot.com)
not only allow their customers to rate its service, but the service is provided by those same
customers; they provide the information that is diffused by the site. Every Slashdot member has
a karma number. When that member does something that bene￿t the site (submitting a story
that is accepted, posting a comment that gets moderated up, moderating others’ comments), the
user’s karma level increases. When that user does something that the site administrators want to
discourage (posting something that gets moderated down, making moderations that are deemed
unfair), the user’s karma level decreases.
The ways in which information about the intermediary’s service are spread can be introduced
in the model by considering successive generation of customers, and a probability that a customer
who got dissatis￿ed will tell so to the new generation of customers. This ‘vocality’ parameter
can be easily integrated in the model, and would make the intermediaries more wary in their
recommendations.
6.3 Patterns in competition
There could be more complicated patterns of customer frequentation, with new customers each
period, and some random probability governing changes in customer traf￿c at each intermedi-
32ary. This would probably more accurately re￿ect reality, where the probability to use the service
of one intermediary is dependent on its current popularity among existing customers. It would
then make sense to ask suppliers of a given type to give selective exclusivity, asking them not to
register at some intermediaries, and letting them register at some others. The simple pattern of
customer frequentation adopted in this model re￿ects what happens when there is a dominant ac-
tor in the market, and intermediaries are ranked vis-￿-vis this actor and serve only as alternatives.
In that more complicated setting, the basic conclusions from the simple model would readily
translate: the constraint on the price that can be practiced at one intermediary would depend on
the incentive of the intermediary that stands to gain the most from a degradation of its service.
The constraint would be less severe than in the simple model, since no intermediary would stand
to gain all the customers of another intermediary, but the system would still favor in￿exible but
objective contracts compared to the monopoly case.
In this model, intermediaries can divert advertisers from another intermediary and thus de-
grade its quality of service. That mechanism was chosen because it provides some easy to ￿nd
limit on the prices that can be practiced at each intermediary, and conveys the basic point that
some contracts are more sensitive than others to ‘sabotage’ by other intermediaries. Other tech-
nologies than bribing could be introduced to represent the various ways in which competitors can
try to degrade the quality of service at one intermediary in order to gain customers.
6.4 Cost structure of the intermediary
An information intermediary must incur high upfront capital costs for hardware, software de-
velopment, and for advertising and marketing expenses to attract traf￿c. The main reason a
simple variable cost structure was adopted was because if some ￿xed cost was introduced into
the equation, then there would be no incentive for intermediaries too far down into the chain of
intermediaries to be active, as they would not receive enough customers to justify being in busi-
ness. Also, an intermediary who would lose customers each period would reach a point where
it would choose to stop its activity. Introducing ￿xed costs thus poses some modeling problems
while not changing the basic structure and conclusions of the model.
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Notes
1In the Interactive Advertising Bureau (￿IAB￿) terminology, which we will alternatively use, billboard pricing is
referred to as CPM pricing (cost per thousand impressions), as opposed to performance deals, which we refer here to
as click-through based pricing. The IAB (www.iab.net) is an association for online, interactive broadcasting, email,
wireless and interactive television media companies.
2This corresponds to a situation where a consumer needs a speci￿c information that is part of a bundle of in-
formation (the supplier’s product. The information’s value is V and the supplier sells his bundle at p; so that if the
information is provided, the value of the bundle is V ￿ p = v while if it is not, the value of the bundle is ￿p =v.
The supplier cannot charge different price depending on whether it has the information the consumer wants or
not, as any information he may give about his product is either not credible or gives away the product.
In that view, an uninformative bundle generates revenue rL = p while an informative one, which costs c to
produce, will generate revenue rH = p ￿ c:
Note also that we consider only marginal costs of production in this model, as they are the only ones that enter
into the decision of the actors since ￿xed costs of production already are incurred.
3Note that there is no need to study updating of belief about the type of the intermediary over time, as under the
customer’s strategy, as soon as its service is of bad quality, the intermediary is dropped, while the condition under
which the intermediary is used in the ￿rst place ensures it will be used in subsequent periods if its service keeps on
being of high quality.
4Blogs are regularly updated personal websites. Some of them are reliable sources of specialized information.
5This doesn’t mean the proper comparison would have to be the one between a monopoly who holds all products
and can satisfy each customers each period, and many intermediaries each holding one product, with customers
visiting intermediaries until they ￿nd their desired product. Indeed, there are limitations on the number of products
an intermediary may hold at one location￿think of the limits on the amount of information than can be held on a
computer screen when you visit a web site. That limit is taken into account in this model, where one intermediary
may give only one advice each period. The conclusions of this model hold even if an intermediary is allowed to give
two or more advices to a customer each period. This only means an intermediary has a higher chances to satisfy a
customer each period.
6This re￿ects limitations both in the capacity of an intermediary to list suppliers, and in the capacity of suppliers
to get listed at all intermediaries
35A Proof of claim 1
The intermediary offers a menu of contract C = (p;q) and C = (p;q) which will be chosen by
suppliers of type H and L respectively. The intermediary guarantees q = q or q customers to the
supplier depending on the contract he chose.
The contract variables must verify the following incentive and rationality constraints:
(rH ￿ p)q ￿ (rH ￿ p)q (27)
(rL ￿ p)q ￿ (rL ￿ p)q (28)
(rH ￿ p)q ￿ 0 (29)
(rL ￿ p)q ￿ 0 (30)
which leads to
rL(q ￿ q) ￿ pq ￿ pq ￿ rH(q ￿ q) (31)
which is possible only if
q ￿ q ￿ 0 (32)
because rH ￿ rL:
Since
(rL ￿ p)q ￿ (rL ￿ p)q ￿ (rH ￿ p)q ￿ (rH ￿ p)q (33)
we will have (rH ￿ p)q = 0 .
So that either
rH ￿ p = 0 (34)
or
q = 0 (35)
The participation constraint for type H supplier is saturated and the incentive constraint for type
L suppliers will be saturated:
(rL ￿ p)q = (rL ￿ p)q (36)
If p = rH : Since both suppliers can participate, the intermediary’s expected pro￿t function is
￿i =
￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq
1 ￿ [￿(1 ￿
max(q￿qH;0)




indeed, with probability ￿; it is a supplier of type H that comes, and he pays pq; or with
probability (1 ￿ ￿) it is a supplier of type L which pays pq: If C was chosen, which means the
36supplier is of type H; and q ￿ qH; then a portion
q￿qH
qH of customers will not come back next
period because they were directed to the supplier of type H even though he could not satisfy their
taste. The same kind of thing happens if it was a supplier of type L that came and q ￿ qL: This
explains the discount factor.
Now, suppose q < q = qL which is an objective placement system. Then, because qH ￿ qL;
we have q ￿ qH < q ￿ qL: Therefore, when the intermediary wants to increase either q or q; he
will want to increase q ￿rst because it increases the numerator and the impact on the denominator
is nil. Therefore, the intermediary will set q at its maximum, subject to q ￿ q; so that q will be set
equal to q: Then p(q) = p(q) because else, each supplier would simply choose the lowest priced
contract.
If q = 0 : The intermediary sets p = rL and the contract is equivalent to excluding one type
of supplier.
This means the intermediary will offer an unique contract, C = (p;q) = (rH;qL) which
guarantees objective placement and will make pro￿t of
rHqL
1￿￿i :
Suppose now the intermediary decides to mislead some customers from that situation of ob-
jective placement. He can increase either q or q. If he increases q then he must increase q because
we must have q < q: And if he increases q; he can as well increase q because that increase in
q only results in increasing the numerator with no change in the denominator. Therefore, the
objective placement system under BB must be compared to a system where an unique contract






and that pro￿t is
lower than
rHqL




: The optimal contract is invariant over time; if it is pro￿table









; then C = (rH;qH) is offered.
B Proof of claim 2
The intermediary’s program is the following:
Max
p;q;p;q
￿(p ￿ c)e qH + (1 ￿ ￿)(p ￿ c)e qL
1 ￿ [￿(1 ￿
max(e qH￿qH;0)





rH ￿ p > 0 (39)
37with e qS denoting the number of customers directed by the intermediary when he ￿nd out the
supplier is of type S = H or L:
The best way the intermediary can better the BBqL system and still remain objective is to set
e qS = qS with qS being the type of the supplier. Indeed, the intermediary will not want to replicate
the outcome of the BB contract￿for example here, the second best is to set e qS = qH; 8S exactly
as it was the second best in the BB case, but this second best brings less pro￿ts than the BA’s
second best since it still requires to pay c: The only original outcome that can be achieved under
the CT system is the one where he directs the maximum number of customers that can be satis￿ed
by a supplier after having determined the match between each customer and the supplier at cost
c per customer. The pro￿t function will then be
Eq(rH￿c)
1￿￿ : the intermediary directs an average of
Eq customers per period, and does not lose any each period.




this must be compared to
rHqL
1￿￿ which is the pro￿t under BB, and CT is
chosen for c <
￿rH(qH￿qL)
￿qH+(1￿￿)qL:









)￿ which is the pro￿t under BB









C Proof of claim 3
Suppose the BB placement system is used and a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with objective place-
ment is sustainable. The optimal strategy for the intermediary will be shown to still be to propose
only one contract C = (p;q); but this time, the price p must be set such that the next intermedi-
ary is not tempted to buy exclusivity from suppliers. This will deter deviation where competing
intermediaries ask for exclusivity from one type of supplier only. As before, suppose p is such
that both suppliers can afford it, or p ￿ rH:
Let’s look at a menu of C = (p;q) contracts and suppose that among the contracts offered,
there is one that is acceptable to suppliers of type H (i.e. p ￿ rH).
The program of the intermediary is the following:
Max
p;q;p;q
￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq
1 ￿ [￿(1 ￿
max(q￿qH;0)





(rH ￿ p)q ￿ 0 (41)
(rL ￿ p)q ￿ 0 (42)
(rH ￿ p)q ￿ (rH ￿ p)q (43)
(rL ￿ p)q ￿ (rL ￿ p)q (44)
(rH ￿ p)q ￿
(q ￿ ￿ max[q ￿ qH;0])
qH
￿ (￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq) (45)
(rL ￿ p)q ￿
[￿(q ￿ ￿ max[q ￿ qH;0]) + (1 ￿ ￿)(q ￿ ￿ max[q ￿ qL;0])]
qH
￿ (￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq) (46)
The additional constraints (compared to the monopoly case) are that the intermediary does not
￿nd it pro￿table to buy exclusivity from one or both type of suppliers, and they are de￿ned
below: The expected pro￿t of SL (suppliers of type low ) is ￿L = q(rL ￿ p); while the expected
pro￿t of SH is ￿H = q(rH ￿ p). Due to the incentive constraints, ￿L is more than ￿H so
that the intermediary n + 1 can choose to get exclusivity from both type of suppliers by paying
max(￿L;￿H) to all suppliers, or choose to get exclusivity from only one type of suppliers by
paying min(￿L;￿H) = ￿H to suppliers of type H: Since intermediary n + 1 is in the same
situation as intermediary n; he will choose the same strategy as intermediary n; which means
his pro￿t per customer will be the same as that of intermediary n: There will therefore be no
subsidization where only one type is encouraged to deviate (type H), if
￿q(rH ￿ p) ￿ ￿(q ￿ ￿ max[q ￿ qH;0]) ￿
￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq
qH
(47)
The term on the left hand side of those expressions is the cost of subsidizing type H suppliers,
and the right hand side term is the additional number of disappointed consumers as only type L
suppliers will stay at In; compared to the number of consumers In+1 would have received if it
had not bought the exclusivity from suppliers of type H: Indeed, if a supplier of type H sells its
exclusive contract with In to the intermediary In+1 in this period, the total number of consumers
In+1 gets is ￿(qH) + (1 ￿ ￿)(qH ￿ q + ￿ max[q ￿ qL;0]): Indeed, with probability ￿; there is
no supplier left at In; so that he must relinquish all his customers who go directly to In+1 in this
period, and with probability (1 ￿ ￿) the supplier at In was of type L; and then, In directs q of
them to that supplier, and if q is more than qL; those who got dissatis￿ed go to In+1 next period. If
In+1 had not asked for exclusivity from suppliers of type H; then the expected number of clients it
would have had would have been ￿(qH￿q+￿ max[q￿qH;0])+(1￿￿)(qH￿q+￿ max[q￿qL;0]).
The additional consumers gained from exclusivity is therefore ￿(q￿￿ max[q￿qH;0]): The pro￿t
that In+1 gets from those consumers is the same as the per consumer pro￿t that In makes, because
all intermediaries adopt the same strategy, since they are facing the same competitive situation7.
39In the same manner, both types will not be encouraged to deviate if
q(rL￿p(q)) ￿ [￿(q￿￿ max[q￿qH;0])+(1￿￿)(q￿￿ max[q￿qL;0])]￿
￿pq + (1 ￿ ￿)pq
qH
(48)
Like in the monopoly case, the intermediary who wants to do objective placement will pro-
pose only one contract C, but now p will be constrained by the no-deviation conditions instead of
being constrained by the individual rationality constraints. As for the level of q; the two choices,
as usual, are either maximizing long-term pro￿t and setting q = qL; or maximizing short-term
pro￿ts and setting q = qH.
In the case where q = qL; then the pro￿t of the intermediary must be such that it discourages
competitors (who make the same pro￿t per customer) from trying to make both types of suppliers
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The intermediary will choose q so as to obtain maximum pro￿t, and BBqL is preferred to
BBqH for ￿ ￿ B









D Proof of claim 4
Pro￿ts under CT contracting is ￿rst de￿ned, and there only remains then to compare it to pro￿ts
under the BB system to determine the above ranges.
The competition game goes as follows: Intermediary n+1 cares mostly about intermediary n,
since disappointed or undirected consumers of that intermediary will most directly go to him. He
will therefore be the one who offers the supplier at intermediary n the highest payment to break
its contract with its intermediary. Suppose intermediary n uses the click-through based system,
and fn ￿ rH. e qS is the number of consumers the intermediary directs to the supplier of type S:
The expected pro￿t of SL (suppliers of type low ) is ￿L = (e qL)(rL ￿ fn); while the expected
40pro￿t of SH is ￿H = (e qH)(rH ￿ fn): ￿L will be more than ￿H if fn ￿
rHe qH￿rLe qL
e qH￿e qL : Assume this
is the case in equilibrium8 The intermediary n + 1 can choose to make sure the supplier deviates
by offering him max(￿L;￿H) = ￿L, or choose to get its payment accepted only if the supplier
is of a given type, by offering only min(￿L;￿H) = ￿H. Since intermediary n + 1 is in the same
situation as intermediary n; he will choose the same strategy as intermediary n; which means his
pro￿t per customer will be the same as that of intermediary n: The choice of the intermediary is
between directing customers truthfully, and maximizing long-term pro￿t, or telling all customers
to go to the supplier at hand, thus favoring short-term advantage. There will be no subsidization
where only one type is encouraged to deviate (type H), if
￿n￿qH(rH ￿ fn) ￿ ￿n￿qH ￿ (fn+1 ￿ c) (52)
The left hand term of those expressions is the cost of subsidizing type H suppliers, with ￿n being
the number of customers of n; and the right hand side is the additional number of disappointed
consumers when In+1 got the exclusivity on suppliers of type H as only type L suppliers will
stay at In; multiplied by the pro￿t per customer intermediary n+1 makes. Indeed, if suppliers of
type H accept the payment of the intermediary In+1; in this period, the total number of consumers
In+1 gets is ￿(qH)+(1￿￿)(qH￿qL) - all customers of In if the supplier at In was of type H; and
only qH ￿ qL of them if it was of type L; and thus did not accept its payment - while if In+1 had
not asked for exclusivity from suppliers of type H; then the expected number of clients it would
have had would have been ￿(qH￿qH)+(1￿￿)(qH￿qL) . The additional consumers gained from
exclusivity is therefore ￿qH: The customer who did not get directed at intermediary n because
the supplier who contracted with n deviated will come back next period to intermediary n, and
not to intermediary n + 1; even if n + 1 directed him correctly. Indeed, his a-priori on n was
not lowered￿not being directed is interpreted as a good signal because only intermediaries that
do objective placement do not direct customers. Therefore, the customer gained is gained only
for one period. The pro￿t per customer intermediary n + 1 makes is the same as the pro￿t per
customer of the intermediary n because all intermediaries follow the same strategy since they are
all subject to the same type of constraints. Indeed, for intermediary n+1; the condition translates
in
￿n+1￿qH(rH ￿ fn+1) ￿ ￿n+1￿qH ￿ (fn+2 ￿ c) (53)





The pro￿t that In+1 gets from those consumers is therefore the same as the per consumer
41pro￿t that In makes, because all intermediaries adopt the same strategy, since they are facing the
same competitive situation.9 In the same manner, both types will not be encouraged to deviate if
qL(rL ￿ fn) ￿ (￿qH + (1 ￿ ￿)qL) ￿ (fn ￿ c) (55)
Pro￿ts of the intermediary can be obtained from this: To deter a deviation by a supplier of
















(qL + Eq)(1 ￿ ￿)
(59)
















￿1 as it was assumed that
rL




As mentioned in the analysis of the model in the monopoly part, the intermediary will never
choose the CT contract and set e q other than qt; with t being the type of the supplier because the
BB contract is more ef￿cient in those cases.10
E Proof of proposition 2
The value of ￿ comes from the preceding claims. The right hand side for the acceptable range for
R is the value of using the service of an intermediary with unknown type when the BBqL system
42is used. Let us denote it V:
V = (1 ￿ ")[
qL
qH
v + (1 ￿
qL
qH
)V ] + "[
Eqv + (qH ￿ Eq)v
qH
] (61)
Indeed, with probability 1 ￿ " the intermediary is of a high type, uses the BBqL system, and
therefore directs the customer to a supplier with probability
qL
qH; and the value of the product is v:
Else, the customer goes to another intermediary, whose service’s expected value is V too. With
probability "; the intermediary is of a low type who directs the customer with probability one to
any customer at hand.
F Proof of proposition 5
When comparing the CT system and the BB system, the BBqL system is used for ￿ lower,










which was the limit over which the
BBqL system was used in the monopoly setting. But in that ￿ domain; the CT system is preferred
to the BBqL system for c ￿ rH(1 ￿
qL(2Q)
Eq(Q+qL)) = c2 which is less than c0 = rH(1 ￿
qL
Eq), the limit










: The range of ￿H where the BBqH system will
replace the CT system is
￿H 2 [
rHqH ￿ Eq(rH ￿ c)











In that range, the competition will result in a lowering of welfare as the customers’ belief system
is not sustainable. Even high ￿ intermediaries may present misleading placement: customers
cannot anymore conclude from a bad service that the intermediary is of a low type so that there
is no sustainable punishment system. This means the system will unravel and no customers will
participate because there are no sustainable uncoordinated disciplining mechanisms.
Welfare is increased compared to the monopoly case for any
￿H ￿ min[
1






because then a customer is ultimately directed adequately. The range of c for which the more
ef￿cient CT contract is used will however be reduced compared to the monopoly case, meaning
that the probability to get directed at an intermediary may be decreased.
43